Posterior Market

p(θ | D₁:ₜ) ∝ p(Dₜ | θ) · p(θ | D₁:ₜ₋₁)
round 0

Where a deal can exist

A

Buyer and seller posteriors for one negotiation in the latest round. The hatched area is where both find the price plausible.

Agent beliefs

Mean posterior by behavioural type after the latest round. Same evidence, different beliefs.

Market uncertainty

Inject information

Applied at the start of the next round and stored in the run config.

What happened

Plain-language reading of the current run, followed by the mathematics with this run's numbers.

Posterior mean by behavioural type

C

Transaction price over time

D

Average price per round with the min–max band. Dashed: the latent true value.

Trade volume and failed negotiations

F

Posterior uncertainty by type

G

Average posterior SD σ. Narrow = confident.

Distribution of transaction prices

E

Profit and loss per agent

I

Cash plus holdings valued at the true value. Box = middle 50%, bar = median.

Trade success rate by group

J

Share of each group's negotiations that ended in a trade.

Posterior overlap vs probability of trade

K

Negotiations from the last 10 rounds. Line: share accepted per overlap bin.

Trade probability: buyer type × seller type

L

Accepted ÷ attempted negotiations, whole run.

Who trades with whom

M

Edge width ∝ completed trades. Node size ∝ group size.

Conservative vs neutral vs aggressive

H

Belief accuracy, calibration, trading and profit by group. 90% coverage = share of agents whose 90% credible interval contains θ_true (calibrated ≈ 90%).